An Indicator of Credit Crunch using Italian Business Surveys by Girardi, Alessandro et al.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
An Indicator of Credit Crunch using
Italian Business Surveys
Alessandro Girardi and Marco Ventura and Patrizia Margani
Parliamentary Budget Office, PBO, Rome, Italy, Italian National
Institute of Statistics, ISTAT, Rome, Italy
September 2018
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/88839/
MPRA Paper No. 88839, posted 14 September 2018 15:29 UTC
1 
 
An Indicator of Credit Crunch using Italian Business Surveys 
 
Alessandro Girardia,b, Patrizia Marganib, Marco Venturab 
 
a Parliamentary Budget Office, PBO, Rome, Italy 




This paper presents a two-step procedure to derive a credit crunch indicator for the Italian 
manufacturing sector. Using qualitative firm-level data over the years 2008-2018, nonlinear 
discrete panel data techniques are first applied in order to identify the loan supply curve 
controlling for firm-specific observable characteristics. In the subsequent step, the variation of the 
estimated supply curve that cannot be explained by proxies for loan demand is interpreted as the 
degree of credit squeeze prevailing in the economy at a given point in time. The empirical 
evidence shows that credit crunch episodes are less likely to occur during periods of sustained 
economic growth, or when credit availability for the manufacturing sector is relatively abundant. 
In contrast, a tight monetary policy stance or a worsening of the quality of banking balance sheets 
tend to increase the likelihood of experiencing a credit squeeze. 
 
 
JEL: G30; G32; C23 







During periods of financial distress, troubles affecting the credit system are likely to spread to the 
real sector, especially in countries where the banking sector is the most relevant financing channel 
to the business sector and/or the productive structure is predominantly based on small and 
medium enterprises (Ferrando et al., 2014; Berger and Udell, 2006). In this respect, the Italian case 
looks particularly interesting not only because of the historical reliance of its productive structure 
on banks' external funds (Manaresi and Pierri, 2018) but also in view of the widely documented 
existence of credit rationing for most of the Italian firms (Guiso, 1998; Finaldi Russo and Rossi, 
2001; Becchetti and Trovato, 2002; Trovato and Alfo, 2006; Minetti and Zhu, 2011). It therefore 
comes as no surprise that the financial turmoil in the aftermath of the Global Recession and the 
sovereign debt crisis has stimulated a lively debate on the existence of credit crunch for the case 
of the Italian economy over the most recent years (see, among others, Presbitero et al., 2016). 
From a theoretical perspective, credit crunch episodes are commonly defined as significant shifts 
in the supply curve for loans when a tightening of credit conditions occurs (Bernanke and Lown, 
1991; Udell, 2009). In such circumstances seemingly eligible borrowers find hard to be financed 
due to asymmetric information and agency problems, forcing firms that rely on bank lending as a 
source of external finance to alternative funding channels (for instance, corporate debt issuances) 
or, when this is not a viable option, to insolvency. During bad times, however, it might also be the 
case that firms tend to demand less credit because investment plans are likely to be postponed, so 
that identifying whether the contraction in bank lending originates from a shift in supply or 
demand is a key empirical issue (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995; Oliner and Rudebusch, 1996). 
Accordingly, a proper identification of credit crunch episodes calls for identifying variations in the 
loan supply curve that cannot be explained by determinants of loan demand, including the 
creditworthiness of borrowers or the banks’ opportunity costs of providing risky loans. 
Against this backdrop, this work presents a micro-macro econometric approach to construct a 
credit crunch indicator for the Italian economy by exploiting the information content of firm-level 
(qualitative) data inquiring on their appraisal of the prevailing lending policy of the banking sector. 
The proposed approach has proved itself well suited to the purpose, as firstly documented by the 
work of Borensztein and Lee (2002) on the effects of the financial crisis and the ensuing credit 
crunch in Korea. Using German data, instead, Rottman and Wollmershauser (2013) have estimated 
the probability of a restrictive loan supply policy, while Fidrmuc and Hainz (2013) have studied 
how differences in regulation influence competition between domestic and foreign banks. For the 
case of Italy, Pigini et al. (2016) have used a sample of manufacturing firms to document state 
dependency in access to credit, that is the occurrence that firms having faced a credit contraction 
in the past may suffer from a negative impact on the outcome of a subsequent loan application. 
Using the same dataset of Pigini et al. (2016), Presbitero et al. (2016) have tried to address the 
question whether troubles in the banking system reflected in the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers 
in September 2008 have spurred a credit crunch.  
Here we build on an updated version of the estimation sample of Pigini et al. (2016) and 
Presbitero et al. (2016) to derive a credit crunch indicator by following a two-step procedure along 
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the lines of Rottman and Wollmershauser (2013). Specifically, we apply nonlinear discrete 
outcome panel-data model to regress the responses to firms' assessment about the access to 
credit on a large set of observable firm-specific characteristics (like firm size, current and expected 
liquidity conditions, ability to operate abroad, current domestic and foreign order books, demand 
expectations) and regional controls (namely, export propensity, quality of credit markets, 
efficiency of the judicial system). The regression model also allows for a set of quarterly time 
dummies whose coefficients (and in particular the associated average probability effects) are 
interpreted as (unobserved) factors determining banks' loan supply unrelated to the 
creditworthiness of borrowers. Subsequently, the estimated time dummies are regressed on a 
synthetic indicator, which distils information about firms' demand for banking loans, including the 
opportunity costs of providing risky loans or the corporate spread (i.e. the difference between the 
corporate borrowing rate and the Euribor rate). As in Rottman and Wollmershauser (2013), the 
residuals of the second-stage are interpreted as shifts of the loan supply curve: the more positive 
the contribution of the residual term to the firms’ perception of a restrictive willingness to lend 
(holding constant the determinants of loan demand), the higher the likelihood that the economy 
has experienced a credit crunch episode. 
Using monthly data covering the period from March 2008 to June 2018, we document that the 
proposed credit crunch indicator flags the Global Recession of 2008-2009 as a period of credit 
crunch for the Italian economy followed by a relatively accommodating intermezzo coming to a 
halt with the eruption of the second recessionary episode in 2012-2014. In the most recent period, 
the unconventional monetary interventions by ECB seem to have somewhat improved banks’ 
willingness to lend as witnessed by the sizeable retracement of the indicator from its historical 
maxima, although signs of less favorable credit conditions emerge towards the end of the 
estimation sample. In order to identify the most relevant factors that might affect the evolvement 
over time of the proposed indicator, we have also conducted some scenario analyses under 
realistic data-availability conditions in order to cope with the publication calendar of the series 
involved in the regression (Leduc and Sill, 2013; Girardi, 2014). The empirical evidence based on 
fractional logit and probit regression models shows a negative and statistically significant effect of 
GDP growth and (relative) credit availability for the manufacturing sector on the probability of an 
episode of credit crunch. In contrast, rising interest rates or a worsening of the quality of banking 
balance sheets increase the likelihood of experimenting a credit squeeze. All in all, the model is 
able to capture a large share of total variability of the target series, with the GDP dynamics being 
by far the most relevant determinant of credit squeeze. These conclusions are robust with respect 
to a number of alternative specifications and estimation techniques. 
The rest of paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the data and the empirical framework 
of reference. The proposed credit crunch indicator and the scenario analyses are discussed in 
Sections 3 and 4. Robustness checks and extensions with respect to the baseline specification are 





2. Firm heterogeneity and access to credit: a micro-econometric perspective 
2.1 Firm-specific conditions to access to credit 
Our analysis relies on the monthly firm-level data drawn from the manufacturing tendency survey 
carried out by the Italian National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT) within the Joint Harmonized EU 
Programme of Business and Consumer Surveys (European Commission, 2017). The survey covers 
non-financial firms with at least five employees, operating in the manufacturing sector. Data are 
typically qualitative, meaning that the survey conveys firms' opinions and the respondent firms 
have usually to choose among three possible answers arranged on a Likert scale. The sample has a 
longitudinal structure and it is stratified upon three dimensions: firm size, sectors of economic 
activity (NACE Rev. 2) and geographical areas (NUTS I level). The sample size is of about 4,000 
statistical units each month and embraces the period from March 2008 to June 2018. In particular, 
our estimation sample covers both the global financial crisis and the subsequent turmoil related to 
the sovereign debt crisis, when credit constraints were particularly important and had huge impact 
on economic outcomes (see, for instance Chodorow-Reich, 2014). 
A specific credit section - added to the survey since March 2008 - provides detailed information on 
firms’ assessment of recent short-term developments regarding their access to finance and covers 
bank-firm relationships. It is worth noticing that firms’ assessment about banks’ loan supply 
conditions cannot be considered a-priori as a valid proxy of credit constraints because firms’ 
answers to the questionnaire refer to a change in the credit conditions and are not informative 
about the intensity (that is the level) of the credit restrictions. Nonetheless, they may be 
conceived as a proxy for credit access, capturing in this way both formal and informal constraints 
(Ferrando et al. 2015). From a theoretical perspective, it is possible to interpret firms’ appraisal of 
banks’ loan supply conditions as informative about the location of the loan supply curve 
(Rottmann and Wollmershauser, 2013). In turn, working solely on the loan supply curve makes it 
possible to establish a direct link to the concept of credit crunch, which is typically defined as a 
significant contraction in the credit supply reflected in a tightening of credit conditions (Udell, 
2009)1.  
Qualitative information is collected at the level of the 𝑗-th firm (with 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝐽) doing business in 
the 𝑠-th sector (with 𝑠 = 1, … , 𝑆), located in region 𝑙 = 1, … , 𝐿 and observed at time 𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇. 
In particular, firms’ assessment on credit conditions (𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑗,𝑙,𝑠,𝑡) - that constitutes the response 
variable along our empirical investigation - takes values 1, 2 and 3 according to whether firm’s 
evaluations of credit conditions are considered as ‘getting better’, ‘stable’ or ‘worsening’ with 
respect to the previous three months, respectively. 
 
2.2 Observable firms heterogeneity: candidate explanatory variables 
In addition to firms' self-reported evaluation of the credit conditions, the survey also collects some 
qualitative information about the developments of businesses’ economic activity, some of which 
                                                          
1
 On this issue, see also Costa et al. (2012).  
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may be used as explanatory variables in the analysis. In particular, the set of regressors includes 
variables aimed at capturing: (I) borrowing and liquidity conditions, (II) the degree of export 
orientation, (III) idiosyncratic demand shocks2. The survey also reports some structural 
information on the respondents (number of employees, economic branch and location of the 
economic activity); in this way, it is possible to estimate a credit crunch indicator through the lens 
of the firm’s heterogeneity by size, sector, and location. 
As for (I), there is wide consensus about the close relationship between firm size and access to 
external credit (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995; Carlino and DeFina, 1998; Ehrmann, 2005). In fact, 
firms of different size are differently exposed to credit squeeze: given a lower value of assets and a 
higher amount of required collateral, small firms are likely to be more credit constrained than 
large ones. In the balance-sheet view, given asymmetric information problems, access to credit 
depends on the value of firms’ assets, acting as collateral. Size matters also for the bank-lending 
view. A tighter monetary policy reduces the amount of credit for borrowers implying that small 
firms, that are likely to be more dependent on intermediated credit, are more adversely affected 
than large firms, which can rely on easier access to other forms of external finance. Accordingly, 
the (logarithm of the) number of employees (𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑗,𝑙,𝑠,𝑡) as a proxy for access to capital market 
(ability to borrow) is used. Internal liquidity may act as a key channel to finance firms’ investment 
decisions. In this case, different liquidity degrees of equities may affect differently entrepreneurs' 
investments (Kiyotaki and Moore, 2012). Liquidity conditions are captured by two dummy 
variables indicating whether the respondent evaluates its level of liquidity with respect to 
operational needs (𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑗,𝑙,𝑠,𝑡) as good, neither good or bad, or bad (reference category). Moreover, 
as firms’ production decisions might also be forward looking (Galí and Gertler, 1999; Galí et al., 
2001, among others), expectations are also taken into account: firms’ expectations about liquidity 
conditions are captured by dummy variables indicating whether the firm expects over the next 
three months liquidity conditions will improve, remain unchanged or deteriorate (reference 
category) (𝑙𝑖𝑞_𝑓𝑤𝑑𝑗,𝑙,𝑠,𝑡).  
Concerning (II), several studies show that firm heterogeneity in export propensity occurs in each 
industry (for instance, Bernard and Jensen, 2004; Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008). For this reason, the 
incidence of firm’s exports on total turnover (only available on a quarterly basis) is included in the 
model to measure the capacity to operate abroad (𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑗,𝑙,𝑠,𝑡). In a small open economy like Italy, 
where the domestic cycle has a closer link with the world one, being an intense exporter gives 
more opportunities to raise production activity during expansions and provides greater chances 
for a smooth production reduction over recession phases (thanks to market diversification).  
Finally, with reference to (III), it is well known that heterogeneity of firms along the cycle may also 
be caused by demand variations across producers (Foster et al., 2008).  In the present context, we 
exploit information concerning domestic (𝑜𝑟𝑑_𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑗,𝑙,𝑠,𝑡) and foreign (𝑜𝑟𝑑_𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑗,𝑙,𝑠,𝑡) orders to 
control for the cyclical demand conditions at home and abroad, respectively. More specifically, 
firms are asked to indicate whether the domestic and foreign demand level is high, normal or low 
                                                          
2
 Appendix A offers a detailed overview of the questions from the manufacturing survey used in this paper. For further details on 
the survey, see European Commission (2017). 
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over the reference period. Operationally, two dummies for both 𝑜𝑟𝑑_𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑗,𝑙,𝑠,𝑡 and 𝑜𝑟𝑑_𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑗,𝑙,𝑠,𝑡 
have been introduced, with the respective low levels being used as reference categories. As for 
the expected sign, they are likely to affect negatively the outcome variable. Information on 
demand expectations (𝑑𝑒𝑚_𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑗,𝑙,𝑠,𝑡) is also exploited: in detail, dummy variables indicating 
whether the firm expects that in the near future its demand level will increase, remain unchanged 
or decrease (reference category), respectively are used.  
2.3 Further controls: regional characteristics 
Firm-specific variables have been complemented with NUTS-3 data aimed at capturing the quality 
of local credit markets as well as other relevant factors characterizing the socio-economic context 
in which firms operate. It is widely understood that local characteristics such as financial 
development and institutions are likely to influence the long-term averages of the firm-level 
variables (Basile et al., 2014). If these local characteristics are not controlled for, the effect of firm 
level variables will be likely to reflect unobserved local factors that systematically affect the 
observed individual heterogeneity in the access to credit. As for local credit market conditions, for 
instance, a commonly held view is that firms, notably small and medium ones as those 
characterizing the Italian manufacturing sector, can only borrow locally (Petersen and Rajan, 
2002). Firms’ ability to access to external finance is thus directly tied to the degree of local credit 
market development (Guiso et al., 2013). Accordingly, the set of regressors has been extended so 
as to include covariates aimed at capturing the degree of local financial backwardness (𝑏𝑤𝑑) and 
the quality of local lending policies proxied by the ratio between bad loans and overall bank loans 
(𝑞𝑙𝑝).  
At the same time, firms’ productive levels are likely to reflect local market conditions, especially 
for the case of those selling (part of their production) abroad, as firms’ export propensity (𝑜𝑝𝑛) is 
typically found to be highly affected by local spillovers, i.e. by the export decisions of nearby firms 
(Koenig et al., 2010). In particular, following Basile et al. (2014) a local measure of trade openness 
based on the export shares in sectors characterized by high dynamic world demand (namely, 
chemical products and pharmaceutics, computer and electronics, electrical tools, and transport) is 
constructed in our context. Moreover, the contractual environment in which firms operate, the 
local judicial system (𝑖𝑢𝑠) may affect firms’ choices regarding investments, employment, 
organizational models, contractual relationships with counterparts and, thus, firms’ size 
(Giacomelli and Menon, 2012; Boschi et al., 2014).  
 
2.4 Dealing with non-observable heterogeneity: an Ordered Probit Model (OPM) approach 
Given the qualitative nature of the response variable, we resort to the OPM framework with 
individual Random Effects (RE-OPM). The basic notion underlying this approach is the existence of 
a latent or unobserved continuous variable, in our case 𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑗,𝑙,𝑠,𝑡
∗  representing firms’ opinion on 
credit conditions, ranging from − to +, which is related to a set of explanatory variables by the 
standard linear relationship: 
𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑗,𝑙,𝑠,𝑡
∗ = 𝛽′𝑥𝑗,𝑙,𝑠,𝑡 + 𝛾′𝑤𝑙 + 𝑧𝑠 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝑢𝑗,𝑙,𝑠,𝑡      (1) 
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for 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝐽, 𝑙 = 1, … , 𝐿, 𝑠 = 1, … , 𝑆, 𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇, and where 𝑥𝑗,𝑙,𝑠,𝑡 is a vector of time-varying 
regressors of firm j, operating in sector s, located in region l at time t. 𝑤𝑙 is a vector of time-
invariant regional covariates, 𝛽’s and 𝛾’s denote the associated conformable parameter vectors, 𝑧𝑠 
stands for a vector of sector fixed effect, 𝜏𝑡  is a (quarterly) time fixed effect, while 𝑢𝑗,𝑙,𝑠,𝑡 is a 
random error term (McKelvey and Zavoina, 1975). In order to fully capture the effect of individual 
heterogeneity, the RE-OPM approach assumes that both time-invariant, 𝜐𝑗,𝑙,𝑠, and time-varying, 
𝜀𝑗,𝑙,𝑠,𝑡, unobserved factors may contribute to explain firms’ assessments on access to credit. If we 
express the random error term as 𝑢𝑗,𝑙,𝑠,𝑡 = 𝜐𝑗,𝑙,𝑠 + 𝜀𝑗,𝑙,𝑠,𝑡, model (1) can be written as: 
𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑗,𝑙,𝑠,𝑡
∗ = 𝛽′𝑥𝑗,𝑙,𝑠,𝑡 + 𝛾
′𝑤𝑙 + 𝑧𝑠 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝜐𝑗,𝑙,𝑠 + 𝜀𝑗,𝑙,𝑠,𝑡     (2) 
where both error components are assumed to be normally distributed and orthogonal to the set 
of predictors. Since the underlying variance of the composite error, 𝜎𝑢
2 = 𝜎𝜐
2 + 𝜎𝜀
2, is not 
identified, we normalise 𝜎𝜀





2 + 1), and, 
thus, 𝜎𝜐 = [𝜌/(1 − 𝜌)]
1/2. Assuming a standard normal distribution for the error term yields the 
OPM3.  
Although 𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑗,𝑙,𝑠,𝑡
∗  is unobserved, it is related to the integer index 𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑗,𝑙,𝑠,𝑡 through the relationship 
𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑗,𝑙,𝑠,𝑡 = 𝑚 ↔  𝜆𝑚−1 < 𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑗,𝑙,𝑠,𝑡
∗ < 𝜆𝑚, with 𝑚 = 1, … , 𝑀, and 𝜆1 through 𝜆𝑚−1, are the 
unobserved thresholds defining the boundaries between different levels of 𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑗,𝑙,𝑠,𝑡. Given the 
relationship between 𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑗,𝑙,𝑠,𝑡 and 𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑗,𝑙,𝑠,𝑡
∗  and indicating by Γ the set of all parameters and by 
𝑍𝑗,𝑙,𝑠,𝑡 the model matrix, we can express the conditional cell probabilities (that is, the probability of 
observing a firm having a 𝑚 value of 𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑗,𝑙,𝑠,𝑡) as: 
Pr(𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑗,𝑙,𝑠,𝑡 = 𝑚|𝑍𝑗,𝑙,𝑠,𝑡) = Pr(𝜆𝑚−1 ≤ 𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑗,𝑙,𝑠,𝑡
∗ ≤ 𝜆𝑚)  














)    










)    (3) 




.  Note that for 𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑗,𝑙,𝑠,𝑡 = 1, the second term on the right hand 
side of (3) drops out and for  𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑗,𝑙,𝑠,𝑡 = 𝑀 the first term equals 1. Estimations are performed using 
maximum likelihood. Individual heterogeneity is unobserved; therefore, to obtain the 
unconditional log-likelihood we need to integrate the conditional log-likelihood. The integration is 
done with the Gauss–Hermite quadrature (25 points were chosen; Greene, 2005). 
Condition (3) implies that the RE-OPM is equivalent to 𝑀 − 1 binary regressions with the critical 
assumption (known as the parallel regression assumption, PRA) that Γ is identical across each 
regression. Should the PRA not hold, however, estimates may be biased and standard errors may 
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 Alternative distributions are the logit, log-logistic and the complementary log-log. 
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be inconsistent. Furthermore, it may be the case that the covariates have asymmetric effects 
within different categories, implying that the analysis based on the PRA may reveal no net effect. 
Extending to longitudinal data the modelling strategy of Maddala (1983) and Terza (1985), where 
the hypothesis of fixed threshold parameters is relaxed by making them dependent on the 
predictors, Boes and Winkelmann (2010) introduce time-invariant individual effects to vary across 
ordinal categories. Under the hypothesis of equal slope parameters for both time-varying and time 
invariant regressors, that is when the systems of equalities 𝛽1 =. . . = 𝛽𝑀−1 and 𝛾1 =. . . = 𝛾𝑀−1 
hold, the standard RE-OPM is nested into the generalized RE-OPM. The (implicit) restrictions 
embedded in the former can be tested against the latter by performing a 𝜒2-distributed LR test. 
Summing up, the RE-OPM gives consistent estimates under PRA. The generalized RE-OPM does 
not impose such a restriction, thus a test of RE-OPM consistency can be carried out by comparing 
the two models. 
 
3. Estimation results: the baseline case 
3.1 Controlling for unobserved heterogeneity 
When estimating model (2), one should bear in mind some intricacies related to the assumption of 
orthogonality between error components and the set of predictors. If the explanatory variables 
and the individual specific effects are correlated, the RE-OPM may lead to inconsistent estimates. 
A possible route to overcome this issue consists in including time averages of the time-varying 
variables (?̅?𝑗,𝑙,𝑡) as additional time-invariant regressors, commonly referred to as level effects, 
estimating in this way the so-called Mundlak-Chamberlain’s RE-OPM (Wooldridge, 2002). 
Modelling the expected value of the firm-specific error as a linear combination of the elements of 
?̅?𝑗,𝑙,𝑡: 
𝐸(𝜐𝑗,𝑙,𝑠|𝑥𝑗,𝑙,𝑠,𝑡) = 𝜓′?̅?𝑗,𝑙,𝑡         (4) 
so that 𝜐𝑗,𝑙,𝑠 = 𝜓′?̅?𝑗,𝑙,𝑡 + 𝜉𝑗,𝑙,𝑡, where 𝜓 is a conformable parameter vector and 𝜉𝑗,𝑙,𝑡 is an 
orthogonal error with respect to 𝜓′?̅?𝑗,𝑙,𝑡.  Accordingly, we may recast model (2) as: 
𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑗,𝑙,𝑠,𝑡
∗ = 𝛽′(𝑥𝑗,𝑙,𝑠,𝑡 − ?̅?𝑗,𝑙,𝑡)?̇?𝑗,𝑙,𝑠,𝑡 + (δ + 𝛽)
′?̅?𝑗,𝑙,𝑡 + 𝛾
′𝑤𝑙 + 𝑧𝑠 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝜉𝑗,𝑙,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑗,𝑙,𝑠,𝑡  or 
𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑗,𝑙,𝑠,𝑡
∗ = 𝛽′?̇?𝑗,𝑙,𝑠,𝑡 + 𝜓′?̅?𝑗,𝑙,𝑡 + 𝛾
′𝑤𝑙 + 𝑧𝑠 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝜉𝑗,𝑙,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑗,𝑙,𝑠,𝑡     (5) 
with δ + 𝛽 = 𝜓 and ?̇?𝑗,𝑙,𝑠,𝑡 = 𝑥𝑗,𝑙,𝑠,𝑡 − ?̅?𝑗,𝑙,𝑡 representing the so called shock effect. Also, we 
assume both errors 𝜉𝑗,𝑙,𝑡 and 𝜀𝑗,𝑙,𝑠,𝑡 to be normally distributed conditionally on 𝑍. Under these 
conditions, the same estimation procedure as discussed for the standard RE-OPM can be 
employed. Notice that the specification (2) is nested into (5) under the hypothesis that all the 
parameters collected in vector 𝜓 are statistically equal to zero. This assumption can be tested 
through a conventional 𝜒2-distributed likelihood ratio (LR) test. 
 
3.2 Empirical evidence 
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Column A of Table 1 presents the estimation results from a pooled-OPM specification. Overall, we 
find that borrowing and liquidity constraints (𝑙𝑖𝑞 and 𝑙𝑖𝑞_𝑓𝑤𝑑, respectively) exert a statistically 
significant role on the response variable. The same conclusion holds true when considering 
idiosyncratic demand factors (𝑜𝑟𝑑_𝑑𝑜𝑚 and 𝑜𝑟𝑑_𝑓𝑜𝑟). In contrast, firms’ appraisal of access to 
credit turns out to be weakly affected by export propensity (𝑒𝑥𝑝), as well as the regional control 
concerning the quality of local lending policies (𝑞𝑙𝑝).  
Controlling for unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity [Column (B)] gives qualitatively similar 
results, with a sizeable increase of the likelihood function. Nonetheless, RE-OPM estimates 
confirm that a number of important covariates have only marginally statistical effect on the 
response variable. A possible piece of explanation of these findings may be a specification error in 
the empirical framework owing to the PRA, according to which the effects of the predictors on the 
response variable are identical across categories. We assess empirically such a conjecture by 
relaxing the PRA for those covariates that turned out to be weakly significant or statistically 
insignificant in the RE-OPM specification (namely, export propensity along with local time-
invariant controls). Testing for PRA produces a LR test statistics (40.48) above the critical values of 
a distribution with 6 degrees of freedom at any significance level.  
Consequently, Column (C) presents the estimation results of the generalized RE-OPM model, 
where Equation 1 (Equation 2) refers to the probability that the response variable moves from 
improving to stable (from stable to worsening) firms’ assessment of access to credit. While the 
impact of borrowing and liquidity conditions as well as idiosyncratic demand factors remain 
unchanged with respect to the previous specifications, the split reveals some interesting 
asymmetric effects for the remaining classes of predictors. Export propensity and local controls 
have a significant impact on firms’ assessment on access to credit in Equation 1 only. In Equation 
2, instead, these predictors play no role except for the degree of openness (𝑜𝑝𝑛), which turns out 
to be marginally significant. 
Table 1 
As the parameters of a latent model do not have a direct interpretation per se, we refer to average 
probability effects (𝑎𝑝𝑒) to summarize what outcome value would be expected given the patterns 
observed between covariates and the outcome itself. By averaging the slope of the regression 
surface with respect to a given covariate across every individual firms in the data, 𝑎𝑝𝑒's can be 
conceived as the average (or typical) outcome we would expect to observe were the model an 
accurate representation of the data-generating process for the response variable. For inference 
purposes, we compute standard errors of the 𝑎𝑝𝑒's using the Delta method. 
Specifically, we use the estimation results from Column (C) of Table 1 to compute the 𝑎𝑝𝑒's for 
both the deviations from the individual average (shock effects) and the differences between 
individuals (level effects). In the discussion of the results collected in Table 2, we focus on the 
𝑎𝑝𝑒's relative to Pr(𝑐𝑟𝑒 = 3), as we are primarily interested on the determinants of firms' 
appraisal of worsening conditions to external financing. It follows that the 𝑎𝑝𝑒’s for Equation 3 
corresponds to the (negative) sum of the 𝑎𝑝𝑒’s relative to Equation 1 and 2. Furthermore, we 
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concentrate the discussion of the results on the shock effects, as they mimic the typical within 
effects in panel models4. 
Table 2 
As for firm size (𝑒𝑚𝑝) the results document a negative and statistically significant effect, 
suggesting that more productive (larger) firms tend to have a relatively less negative assessment 
of credit conditions than the one reported by smaller productive units. The magnitude of the 𝑎𝑝𝑒's 
indicates that for an increase of 1 per cent in firm size, the average predicted probability of firms 
facing worsening credit access falls by around 1 per cent (see the column labelled “Shock effect” 
under “Equation 3”). As expected, both current and expected liquidity conditions (i.e. the rows of 
the Table referring to 𝑙𝑖𝑞 and 𝑙𝑖𝑞_𝑓𝑤𝑑) have a remarkable negative effect on the response 
variable, with the estimated magnitude of the 𝑎𝑝𝑒's falling in the range of 7-13 percentage points. 
By contrast, export intensity (𝑒𝑥𝑝) does not exert a statistically significant impact, while an 
increase of (both domestic and foreign) orders or expected demand conditions (namely, 
𝑜𝑟𝑑_𝑑𝑜𝑚, 𝑜𝑟𝑑_𝑓𝑜𝑟 and 𝑑𝑒𝑚_𝑒𝑥𝑝) tends to reduce the probability of worsened credit conditions 
of about 1-3 percentage points. Finally, trade openness (𝑜𝑝𝑛) is found to have a statistically 
negative impact, suggesting that firms located in relatively more open regions (and thus more 
oriented to foreign competition) tend to exhibit better access to external finance. Overall, the 
evidence from the 𝑎𝑝𝑒's relative to the level effects yields to similar conclusions, with magnitudes 
typically larger than the corresponding shock effects; the only exception is given by firm size 
(although the effect remains negative and statistically significant). Moreover, we find a remarkable 
similarity between the 𝑎𝑝𝑒's for Pr(𝑐𝑟𝑒 = 1) and Pr(𝑐𝑟𝑒 = 2), suggesting that respondent firms 
tend to discriminate between worsening credit conditions vis-à-vis improving or stable conditions 
to access external sources of funding. 
The 𝑎𝑝𝑒's of the quarterly time dummies on Pr(𝑐𝑟𝑒 = 3) (the probability of a worsening in firms' 
self-reported assessment of their access to external credit) is plotted in Figure 1 (continuous black 
line) along with the 95 per cent confidence intervals (grey area). Interestingly, the evolution over 
time of the aggregate indicator of worsening access to external finance conditional on the 
individual level of creditworthiness of firms, 𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑡
(𝑅𝐸)
, signals two main spikes in correspondence of 
the two crisis periods included in the estimation sample, namely the global recession of 2008-2009 





                                                          
4
 As pointed out by Caporale et al. (2012), among others, the parameters of the linear regression model are similar to those for a 
probit model if the distances between the thresholds are nearly identical. In the present context, the fixed thresholds 𝜆's in 
condition (3) are statistically significant at the 1 per cent level and different from one, indicating that the three ordinal categories 
are not equally spaced. 
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4. Deriving the credit crunch indicator 
4.1 Matching supply and demand 
Economic theory posits that credit squeezes generally arise as the result of asymmetric 
information between the borrower and the lender or because of exogenous factors like the 
implementation of more stringent regulatory rules. As for information asymmetry problems, 
borrowers may have incentives to withhold information when asking for credit. Lenders seek to 
tackle this issue by practicing screening (Allen, 1990) and monitoring (Rajan and Winton, 1995) so 
as to mitigate their exposure to counterparty risk. Besides controlling for the creditworthiness of 
borrowers, the identification of credit crunch episodes calls for controlling for banks’ opportunity 
costs of providing risky loans (Bernanke and Lown, 1991) which is commonly epitomized by a 
measure of safe real interest rate. At the same time, it is well known that the implementation of 
some risk-based regulatory rules governing lenders’ allocation of resources may have a significant 
negative impact on the supply of credit (Berger and Udell, 1994). The reduction in credit may thus 
coincide with banks having difficulties in meeting the minimum regulatory capital requirements in 
periods associated with a deterioration in asset quality (Pazarbasioglu, 1996). In particular, we use 
the real long-term interest rate (deflated by the annualized rate of change of the headline price 
index excluding energy, 𝑟𝑙𝑟𝑡, as in Holston et al., 2017, among others) as a proxy for changes in the 
banks’ opportunity costs of providing risky loans. An increase in the safe real interest rate would 
make banks prone to invest more of their funds in risk-free assets, thus reducing the aggregate 
loan supply, ceteris paribus (Bernanke and Blinder, 1988). Hence, a positive relationship between 
𝑟𝑙𝑟𝑡 and 𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑡
(𝑅𝐸)
 is expected. 
The relationship between the (perceived) credit availability and interest rates might also be 
affected by a contraction of the overall volume of credit available for the economy, regardless of 
the corporate borrowing rate on loans charged by banks. In keeping with this argumentation, 
financial intermediaries are expected to be reluctant in extending credit lines with compressed 
credit spread levels (defined as the difference between the corporate borrowing rate and the 
Euribor rate, 𝑐𝑠𝑝𝑡). Accordingly, we include that measure of credit spread to control for potential 
macroeconomic effects on the estimated 𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑡
(𝑅𝐸)
 indicator. The assumption that banks are more 
willing to lend as the margins on corporate borrowing rate increase implies an expected negative 
relationship with the dependent variable. Moreover, we have also included a more direct control 
for the overall level loan demand of enterprises by resorting to the index of loan demand (𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑡) 
from the Bank Lending Survey carried by Bank of Italy. As an increase of 𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑡 signals a rise in the 
maximum amount which enterprises are entitled to borrow (in the form of either new credit lines 
or credit lines previously granted but not yet used) from the banking sector at any given time, an 
inverse relationship between 𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑡 and the evolution of 𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑡
(𝑅𝐸)
 is expected to hold. 
Following Rottmann and Wollmershauser (2013), we derive an indicator of credit crunch by 
regressing the indicator capturing a worsening in the access to external funds conditional on the 
individual level of creditworthiness of firms, 𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑡
(𝑅𝐸)
 reported in Figure 1, on the above discussed 
controls. In other words, we take the ape of 𝜏𝑡 in equation (3), whose estimates are reported in 
Table (2) Equation (3), and regress on: long term interest rate, 𝑟𝑙𝑟𝑡, a measure of credit spread, 
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𝑐𝑠𝑝𝑡, and on the loan demand index, 𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑡. The residual term of this second stage regression, 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑡, 
is likely to capture the mismatch between firms' appraisal of banks' lending policies and their 
determinants from the demand side. The resulting mismatch between supply and demand is 
expected to measure the degree of credit squeeze prevailing in the economy at a certain period 𝑡. 
Owing to the limited temporal extension of our estimation sample, we distil the information 
content conveyed by the candidate explanatory variables into a synthetic indicator by following a 
“nonmodel based” aggregation scheme as discussed in Marcellino (2006). Specifically, 𝑟𝑙𝑟𝑡, as well 
as 𝑐𝑠𝑝𝑡 and 𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑡 (with the inverted sign) are standardised so as to have zero mean and unit 
standard deviation. This step helps avoiding that the resulting (simple) average index of demand 
factors (𝑖𝑑𝑥𝑡), which is calculated in the subsequent step, is dominated by variables with a 
particularly pronounced degree of volatility and/or an incomparably high absolute mean.  
 
4.2 Estimation results 
Estimation results from a standard linear regression model 
𝐸[𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑡
(𝑅𝐸)] = 𝜙0 + 𝜙1𝑡𝑟𝑛𝑑 + 𝜙2𝑖𝑑𝑥𝑡       (6) 
are reported in Table 3 (Equation A.), where the deterministic component includes an intercept 
and a linear trend (𝑡𝑟𝑛𝑑). We document a positive relationship between the response variable and 
the synthetic indicator 𝑖𝑑𝑥𝑡: the estimated parameter is statistically significant at the 1 per cent 
nominal level of significance (or even better) according to the corresponding heteroskedasticity 
and autocorrelation consistent standard errors as devised by Newey and West (1987). Moreover, 
the linear regression is able to explain about three-fourth of the temporal variation of firms’ 
perception of a restrictive banks’ willingness to lend. For comparison purposes, we also report the 
estimation results for the regressions of the response variable on each standardized individual 
component of our synthetic supply index (Equation B., C., and D., respectively). Overall the results 
from these alternative specifications turn out be less satisfactory in terms of both log-likelihood 
and adjusted R-square with respect to our preferred specification (Equation A.), giving support to 
the choice of using a synthetic supply factor measure rather than a specific individual component 
of 𝑖𝑑𝑥𝑡.  
Table 3 
As in Rottmann and Wollmershauser (2013), the residual term from the regression given by 
Equation (6), 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑡, that is the distance between the observed value of 𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑡
(𝑅𝐸) and its predicted 
value, can be interpreted as loan supply shocks.  Specifically, the more positive the contribution of 
loan supply shocks to the firms’ perception of a restrictive willingness to lend, ceteris paribus, the 
higher the probability that the economy is affected by a credit squeeze. On the other hand, 
negative values of 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑡 would signal relatively favourable credit conditions, while the residual is 
expected to be zero in equilibrium. In order to ease economic interpretability, we project 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑡 
onto the [0,1] interval according to the following monotonic transformation:  
𝑐𝑐?̃?𝑡 ≡ (tanh(𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑡) + 1)/2, where tanh (. ) stands for the hyperbolic tangent function, which plots 
the transformed values in the [-1,+1] interval. It is worth noticing that the proposed 
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transformation makes 𝑐𝑐?̃?𝑡’s readings comparable to those of popularly monitored diffusion 
indexes like the Purchasing Manager Index (PMI) series, with the value of 0.5 representing the 
critical threshold to discriminate between periods of credit squeeze (𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑡 > 0) and those when 
credit constraints are not binding (𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑡 < 0)
5.  Given the latent character of the concept of credit 
crunch, there is no track record of "known" credit squeeze in the past. One can therefore only 
inquire whether an indicators' evolvement is plausible. As Figure 2 shows, the 𝑐𝑐?̃?𝑡 indicator flags 
the global recession of 2008-2009 as the most severe episode of credit crunch experienced by the 
Italian economy over the last decade (with a peak of 0.57 in 2008q4). In the ensuing mild recovery, 
the loan supply of banks was laxer until the second recessionary episode in 2012-2014 related to 
the eruption of the sovereign debt crisis and the subsequent fiscal policy measures that 
compressed domestic demand. In the most recent period, dominated by the unconventional 
monetary interventions by ECB, the indicator is found to stand far away from its maxima. This 
evidence suggests that banks’ willingness to lend was perceived as relatively accommodating 
although traces of less favourable credit conditions emerge at the very end of the sample when 
macroeconomic conditions have shown signs of slackening. 
Figure 2 
 
4.3 Using the credit crunch indicator for scenario analyses 
In an effort to sharpen our understanding of how macroeconomic developments affect credit 
availability in the economy, this Section presents a scenario analysis to assess the extent to which 
factors like economic growth, the stance of monetary policy or the domestic money supply, as well 
as the quality of banks’ balance sheet may influence the evolvement over time of the proposed 
credit crunch indicator (see, among others, Laker, 1999). 
Operatively, 𝑐𝑐?̃?𝑡 is modelled as a function of: (a) the log-level of GDP (in first differences), 𝑞𝑡
𝑔𝑑𝑝
; 
(b) the short-term euro repo rate, 𝑞𝑡
𝑠ℎ𝑟; (c) the share of credit supply to the manufacturing sector 
over the overall lending to the private sector, 𝑞𝑡
𝑚𝑎𝑛; (d) the growth rate of bad debts of non-
financial corporations, 𝑞𝑡
𝑛𝑝𝑙. The estimation exercise is performed under realistic data-availability 
conditions so that the current values of our credit crunch indicator are regressed on lagged values 
of the explanatory variables in order to cope with the publication calendar of the series involved in 
the regression (Leduc and Sill, 2013; Girardi, 2014). Specifically, the estimation sample covers the 
period from 2008q2 to 2018q2. The latest available information for our credit crunch indicator is 
available around two weeks after the end of the quarter of reference (when the first quarter’s 
Bank Lending Survey release is disseminated). At that date, we have information on the evolution 
of GDP up to the previous calendar quarter; likewise, quarterly figures for credit supply and non-
performing loans (NPL) reflect lagged data availability, while contemporaneous data on interest 
                                                          
5
 The chosen monotonic transformation yields virtually identical results to the logit function, [
1
1+exp(−𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑡)
], while it looks preferable 
to alternative like those based on the standardized normal distribution Φ(𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑡/𝑠𝑑𝑐𝑐𝑖), where 𝑠𝑑𝑐𝑐𝑖  indicates the sample standard 
deviation of 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑡, or the normalization (𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑡 − 𝑐𝑐𝑖min)/(𝑐𝑐𝑖max − 𝑐𝑐𝑖min), where 𝑐𝑐𝑖min and 𝑐𝑐𝑖max denote the sample minimum 
and maximum value, respectively, because it turns out to be less dependent on possible outliers in the sample. 
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rates may be used. Table 4 presents summary statistics of the observable market characteristics in 
our sample.  
Table 4 
As Table 4 shows 𝑐𝑐?̃?𝑡 is constrained by construction within the interval between 0 and 1. Because 
of the bounded nature of the dependent variable, we cannot implement an ordinary least squares 
(OLS) regression, 




𝑛𝑝𝑙 = 𝑄𝑡𝜃    (7) 
since the predicted values from the OLS regression cannot be guaranteed to lie in the unit 
interval6.  An alternative to the standard OLS specification is 𝐸(𝑐𝑐?̃?𝑡|𝑄𝑡) = 𝐺(𝑄𝑡𝜃) where 𝐺(. ) 
satisfies 0 < 𝐺(𝑧) <  1, for all 𝑧 ∈ ℜ, ensuring that the predicted 𝑐𝑐?̃?𝑡 lies in [0, 1] interval. The 
most common functional forms for 𝐺(. ) are the standard cumulative normal distribution (i.e. the 
fractional-probit model case) and the logistic function (i.e. the fractional-logit model case)7.  Given 
the non-linearity of the functions 𝐺(𝑄𝑡𝜃), the partial effects of the explanatory variables on 𝑐𝑐?̃?𝑡 
are not constant, in contrast to the standard OLS case. Table 5 reports the 𝑎𝑝𝑒's relative to both 
specifications (fractional-logit and fractional-probit regression models). 
Table 5 
The estimation results show a negative and statistically significant effect of GDP growth and 
(relative) credit availability for the manufacturing sector on the dependent variable, while rising 
interest rates or a worsening of the quality of banking balance sheets tend to increase the 
likelihood of experimenting a credit squeeze. Specifically, a GDP increase of 1 per cent is expected 
to reduce the level of the indicator of 1.6 percentage points. The magnitude (in absolute terms) of 
the 𝑎𝑝𝑒’s relative to the short interest rate and the share of loans in manufacturing over the total 
private sector turn out to be broadly similar (+2.6 and -2.2 percentage points, respectively), while 
a less relevant effect emerges for the dynamics of bad loans. All in all, both the fractional-logit and 
fractional-probit model specifications are able to capture about 60 per cent of the overall deviance 
of the response variable, with the GDP dynamics being by far the most relevant determinant of 
credit squeeze, as the decomposition of the explained deviance shows. 
To assess how the predicted 𝑐𝑐?̃?𝑡 varies over the business cycle, we present in Figure 3 (Panel A.) a 
simulation exercise (based on the fractional-logit regression model) where the response 
predictions 𝐸(𝑐𝑐?̃?𝑡|𝑄𝑡) are computed under the assumption that GDP growth moves progressively 
from its maximum (corresponding to quarterly growth rate of about +1.1 per cent) to its minimum 
(corresponding to roughly -2.8 per cent), by keeping the remaining regressors fixed to their sample 
averages. The bold squares plot the resulting partial effects, while the grey lines identify the 
amplitude of the corresponding 95 per cent confidence region. The reported evidence is largely 
consistent with the idea that a relatively favorable economic environment tends to lower the 
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 See, among others, Bastos (2010) and Caporale and Girardi (2013) for a similar application of fraction regression models. 
7
 Note that with the identity function the fraction regression model collapses to the standard OLS regression. The quasi-maximum 




counterparty risk, thereby making banks more inclined to extend loans. During boom times, firms 
(as well as households) are likely to commit larger proportions of their income flows to debt 
servicing, thus establishing a counter-cyclical relationship between credit squeeze and economic 
activity dynamics (Lowe and Rohling 1993). 
Figure 3 
In Panel B., C. and D. of Figure 3 we replicate the same exercise, by moving the interest rate, the 
share of total loans to the manufacturing sector, and the NPL dynamics, alternatively. The effects 
exerted by variables proxying the stance of monetary policy (the short-term interest rate) and the 
degree of (sector) credit availability (the ratio of loans to the manufacturing sector over the total 
loans to the private sector) on the response variable are largely consistent with both the bank 
lending and the balance sheet channels of monetary policy transmission, as Panel B. and Panel C. 
of Figure 3 show8. In both cases, worsened monetary and credit conditions (corresponding to 
interest rate increases and manufacturing to total loans ratio decreases, respectively) tend to 
affect negatively the aggregate loan supply and thereby favoring the occurrence of credit squeeze 
episodes. At the same time, the supply of credit may be crucially affected by the level of bad loans 
in the economy. Panel D. documents that the degree of credit squeeze gets progressively more 
severe when the degree of credit quality tends to deteriorate. This finding is in line with the idea 
that an increased NPL burden implies higher risk weights on bank loan portfolios in the calculation 
of regulatory capital ratios. Consequently, banks are likely to reduce the size of their balance sheet 
to cope with increased risk weights and capital absorption, eventually leading to a decline in loan 
supply (Froot and Stein, 1998; Van den Heuvel, 2008). 
 
5. Extensions 
5.1 Logit-FE and linear-TSLS specifications 
So far, we have controlled for unobserved heterogeneity by introducing long-term averages of 
firm-level variables in the RE-OPM because, within a panel data Fixed Effect OPM (FE-OPM), there 
is no way to solve the incidental parameter problem and the cut-off parameters cannot be 
distinguished from the fixed effect parameters (identification problem). A possible alternative to 
the specification based on Wooldridge (2002) builds on the dichotomization of the ordered 
responses so as to apply the logit fixed effect (logit-FE) model proposed by Chamberlain (1980). 
We argue that the logit-FE specification is well-suited for the issue at stake in the light of the 
evidence of a clear dichotomous pattern as discussed in Section 3.2. Accordingly, we have 
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Specifically, the bank lending channel operates through banks' liability side. It posits that a monetary contraction, by draining 
reserves from the banking system, tends to leave banks with fewer loanable funds, thereby reducing lending (Bernanke and Blinder 
1988). At the same time, a less accommodative monetary policy increases banks’ external finance premium pushing banks to 
respond by reducing the total amount of credit they are willing to supply (Stein 1998). When considering the balance sheet 
channel, a tight monetary policy operates through banks' asset side by reducing the net worth of borrowers with weaker 
fundamentals (Bernanke et al, 1996; Bernanke and Gertler 1989). Furthermore, a less accommodative monetary stance tends to 





generated a dummy variable 𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑗,𝑙,𝑠,𝑡 taking value of 0, if 𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑗,𝑙,𝑠,𝑡 = 1 or 𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑗,𝑙,𝑠,𝑡 = 2, and 1, if 
𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑗,𝑙,𝑠,𝑡 = 3. 
It is worth noticing that the logit-FE framework does not solve the issue related to the potential 
simultaneity between the dependent variable (firms’ appraisal of the access to external finance) 
and the right-hand side regressors. In our context, the problem looks quite complex because of 
the discrete (or limited) nature of both the dependent and the independent endogenous variables. 
Luckily, the seminal work by Angrist (2001) has shown that in the case of a discrete (or limited) 
dependent variable the 𝑎𝑝𝑒's can be consistently estimated by means of a linear two stage least 
squares (linear-TSLS). This result holds true even when the discrete or limited endogenous 
regressors are concerned because only the OLS estimation of the first-stage is guaranteed to 
produce first-stage residuals that are uncorrelated with fitted values and covariates. When the 
model is not correctly specified, indeed, the prediction of a nonlinear first-stage (like the one 
based on logit or probit models) can yield to inconsistent estimates. Accordingly, a nonlinear first-
stage is not necessary, or even not desirable, to the point that is called as the "forbidden 
regression" (Angrist and Pischke 2009, p. 143). 
In operative terms, we have regressed 𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑗,𝑙,𝑠,𝑡 on the same set of explanatory variables as in the 
logit-FE regression equation, instrumenting the potentially endogenous variable, the 𝑥𝑗,𝑙,𝑠,𝑡’s (i.e. 
from 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙 to 𝑑𝑜𝑚_𝑒𝑥𝑝_2 in Table 1) with each first lag, plus the second lag for 𝑙𝑖𝑞_1 . The choice 
of the instruments is motivated by the fact that 𝑥𝑗,𝑙,𝑠,𝑡−1 is correlated with 𝑥𝑗,𝑙,𝑠,𝑡, and the second 
order lag has been included in order to make computable the Sargan-J statistic, checking for the 
quality of the entire set of instruments9. To assess the relevance of the instruments, we report in 
Table 6 the correlation between each potentially endogenous variable 𝑥𝑗,𝑙,𝑠,𝑡 with its own 
instrument, 𝑥𝑗,𝑙,𝑠,𝑡−1 (as well as 𝑥𝑗,𝑙,𝑠,𝑡−2 for the case of 𝑙𝑖𝑞_1). As the Table shows, each 𝑥𝑗,𝑙,𝑠,𝑡 is 
strongly correlated with its lag 𝑥𝑗,𝑙,𝑠,𝑡−1 and the same holds true for 𝑙𝑖𝑞_1𝑡−2 with 𝑙𝑖𝑞_1𝑡, validating 
the relevance of the instruments. 
Table 6 
The second step regression is reported in Table 7 along with some additional tests about the 
quality of the estimates. The Sargan-J does not reject the null of validity of the instruments at the 
usual confidence levels (p-value of 0.28); both the tests for weak- and under-identification reject 






                                                          
9
 Since a large number of instruments can overfit the instrumented variables, leading to inaccurate estimations and wrong 
inference in the Sargan-J test (Roodman, 2009) we have kept the number of over-identifying restrictions to its minimum, i.e. one. 
For this reason, only one second order lag has been included in the set of regressors. 
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5.2 Credit squeeze and macroeconomic fundamentals: a re-assessment 
Before using 𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑗,𝑙,𝑠,𝑡 as a dependent variable in a model matching supply and demand of banking 
loans, we must assess whether it can be considered as a valid proxy for credit constraint perceived 
by firms, so that collapsing answers one and two into a single one does not engender losses of 
useful information. As an initial step, we have plotted in Figure 4 the 𝑎𝑝𝑒's of the time dummies of 
the baseline Generalized RE-OPM specification (𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑡
(𝑅𝐸)
, continuous black line) against those from 
the logit-FE alternative (𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑡
(𝐹𝐸)
, dashed line). The two series show very similar dynamics 
(correlation coefficient of 0.96), suggesting that no relevant information is wasted. A similar result 
is obtained when considering the temporal evolution of the 𝑎𝑝𝑒's relative to the temporal 
dummies for the linear-TSLS specification (𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑡
(𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆)
, dotted line), which shows a degree of 
association with its baseline counterpart of about 95 per cent. 
Figure 4 




 in place 
of 𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑡
(𝑅𝐸)
, alternatively. Estimation results are reported in Table 8, while Figure 5 plots the 
resulting residual terms of the regression that have been normalised as detailed in Section 4.2 
(dashed and dotted lines, respectively). In both cases, the credit crunch indicator is found to be at 
its height during the quarters of the 2008-2009 recession. Subsequently, a temporary retracement 
of the indicator can be detected until the eruption of the 2012-2014 debt crisis. After then, the 
degree of credit squeeze prevailing in the Italian economy turns out to be comfortably below the 
peaks occurred in the occurrence of the two recessionary episodes, pointing to a relatively positive 
firms' appraisal of their access to banking loans.  
Table 8 
Figure 5 
As a final step of our robustness check, we have replicated the scenario analysis discussed in 
Section 4.3. Specifically, model (7) has been estimated by regressing, alternatively, the 
(standardised) residuals of the logit-FE and the linear-TSLS specifications on the same set of 
covariates (namely, GDP growth, the short-term euro repo rate, changes of the share of credit 
supply to the manufacturing sector over the overall lending to the private sector and the growth 
rate of bad debts of non-financial corporations), with the 𝑎𝑝𝑒's (computed from a fractional-logit 
specification) are reported in Table 910. Overall, we find confirmation of the sign of the 𝑎𝑝𝑒's 
discussed in Section 4.3, although the goodness of fit measure tends to be slightly smaller than the 
share of explained deviance for the baseline specification. Nonetheless, GDP growth remains the 
most relevant factor when explaining the temporal evolution of the credit squeeze measure.  
Table 9 
                                                          
10
 For the sake of brevity, we do not report the empirical evidence from the fractional-probit alternative. The estimated 𝑎𝑝𝑒's as 
well as the conclusions from the scenario analysis exercises are virtually identical to those reported in the main text. The complete 
set of results is available from the authors upon request. 
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Panel A. and Panel B. of Figure 6 plot how the response variable varies when each predictor moves 
progressively from its maximum to its minimum by keeping the remaining regressors fixed to their 
sample averages. As in Figure 3, the bold squares indicate the resulting partial effects, while the 
grey lines refer to the amplitude of the corresponding 95 per cent confidence region. In both 
Panels, the upper left graph confirms the existence of a clear counter-cyclical relationship 
between credit crunch and economic activity dynamics. In contrast, the degree of credit squeeze 
gets progressively more severe when stance of monetary policy gets progressively more restrictive 
(the short-term interest rate, upper right graph) or when the amount of (sector) credit availability 
(the ratio of loans to the manufacturing sector over the total loans to the private sector, lower left 
graph) tends to decline.  
Figure 6 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
This work presents a credit crunch indicator for the Italian economy by exploiting firm-level 
information drawn from a representative sample of manufacturing firms over the years from 2008 
to 2018. The proposed empirical procedure consists in two main steps. Firstly, we apply nonlinear 
discrete outcome panel-data model to regress the responses to firms' assessment about the 
access to credit on a large set of observable firm-specific and regional characteristics. The 
regression model also allows for a set of quarterly time dummies whose estimated coefficients are 
interpreted as (unobserved) factors determining banks' loan supply once structural characteristics 
of the borrowers have been controlled for. Subsequently, the temporal profile of the stance of the 
bank lending policies perceived by firms has been regressed on a synthetic indicator that distils 
information relative to loan demand factors, including proxies for banks’ opportunity costs of 
providing risky loans. The residuals of this second-stage are thus interpreted as shifts of the loan 
supply curve: the more positive the contribution of the residual term to the firms’ perception of a 
restrictive willingness to lend, the higher the likelihood that the economy has experienced an 
episode of credit crunch. 
The empirical evidence shows that the probability of credit crunch episodes lowers during periods 
of sustained economic growth and or when credit availability for the manufacturing sector is 
relatively abundant. In contrast, rising interest rates or a worsening of the quality of banking 
balance sheets tend to increase the likelihood of experimenting a credit squeeze. We also 
document that these results are robust to a number of alternative specifications and estimation 
techniques. From an operative viewpoint, the proposed methodology relies on timely available 
data, so that it might have useful applications for institutional purposes and policy analyses. 
Admittedly, no attempt has been made in this paper to investigate whether and to what extent 
the severity of credit crunch has affected in an asymmetric way large and small-medium 
enterprises or firms located in the Centre-North with respect to those operating in Southern 
regions. In this respect, further research would be desirable by splitting the sample according to 
firm employment, as in Criscuolo et al. (2012), or to the spatial location of the productive units, as 
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proposed in Basile et al. (2014). These issues are beyond the scope of the present study, and will 
be the subject of future research. 
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Our analysis uses data collected within the Joint Harmonised EU Programme of Business and 
Consumer Surveys, which inquires every month about 120,000 enterprises, as well as 40,000 
consumers, across Europe (see European Commission, 2017). As for the business sectors, 
enterprises are asked to assess the development of concepts like production, order books, or 
employment. Data are typically qualitative in nature, in the sense that they convey firms' opinions 
- rather than quantitative information - on production, demand, inventories and other variables 
relevant at the firm level. Questions usually ask the firm to choose among three possible answers 
arranged on a Likert scale. As for the temporal horizon, survey questions refer to the present 
situation, developments over the past three months or expectations for the next three months. 
Table A.1 reports the questions of the manufacturing survey and the associated firm-specific 
variables that have been used in the empirical analysis. 
Table A.1 - Survey questions 
Variable Definition Survey question 
𝑒𝑚𝑝 
Number of employees 
(quantitative question) 
What is the number of employees in the current month? 
𝑙𝑖𝑞 
Liquidity (level), with respect 
to operational needs 
In comparison with the previous month, do you consider the current 
level of your liquidity conditions as good, mediocre or bad? 
𝑙𝑖𝑞_𝑓𝑤𝑑 
Liquidity (level), next 3 
months 
Do you expect your liquidity conditions to improve, remain unchanged 
or deteriorate over the next three months? 
𝑒𝑥𝑝 
Export turnover ratio 
(quantitative question) 
What is the export turnover ratio (in percentage terms) in the current 
quarter? 
𝑜𝑟𝑑_𝑑𝑜𝑚 
Domestic order books (level), 
current 
Excluding seasonal changes, do you consider the current level of your 
domestic order book as high, normal or low? 
𝑜𝑟𝑑_𝑓𝑜𝑟 
Export order books (level), 
current 
Excluding seasonal changes, do you consider the current level of your 
export order book as high, normal or low? 
𝑑𝑒𝑚_𝑒𝑥𝑝 
Total order books (level), next 
3 months 
Do you expect your total order books to increase, remain unchanged or 
decrease over the next three months? 
For the case of Italy, the National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT) collects information in the form of 
panels stratified by geographical location, sector and size. Respondents are extracted from the 
official register of active firms. As for the manufacturing sector, the samples size is about 4,000 
firms. Interviews are conducted through Computer Assisted Telephone Interviewing (CATI) in the 
first two weeks of each month and the results are typically published before the end of the 
reference month and not revised afterwards.  
Since March 2008, a specific section focusing on the bank-firm relationship has been added to the 
manufacturing survey in order to collect some information about credit access conditions. 
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Specifically, firms are asked to report their perceptions on credit conditions, with three possible 
answers arranged on a Likert scale (getting better, stable, getting worse). This question 
corresponds to the variable discussed in Section 2.1. Subsequently, firms have to indicate whether 
or not their appraisal is based on a formal contact with a credit institution. 
If it is the case, respondents are asked to specify whether: 
a) their request for credit has been obtained at the same conditions as three months before;  
b) their request for credit has been obtained at worsening conditions. 
If it is the case, a question is additionally asked about its determinants by allowing for the 
following possible answers: (a) higher interest rates, (b) higher collateral (real or personal 
guarantees), (c) limits to the amount of loans, (d) higher costs; 
c) their request for credit has been denied. 
If it is the case, a question is additionally asked about whether credit is due to (a) an 
explicit denial by the financial institution or (b) withdraw by the firm due to excessively 
unfavorable conditions imposed by the financial institution;  







Table 1 – Ordered probit estimation results 
 
(A) Pooled-OPM (B) RE-OPM 
(C) Generalized RE-OPM 



















-0.047*** -0.007** -0.046** -0.012** -0.046** -0.013** -0.046** -0.013** 
(0.016) (0.003) (0.018) (0.006) (0.018) (0.006) (0.018) (0.006) 
𝑙𝑖𝑞_1 
-0.546*** -0.953*** -0.598*** -1.160*** -0.598*** -1.159*** -0.598*** -1.159*** 
(0.015) (0.019) (0.016) (0.039) (0.016) (0.039) (0.016) (0.039) 
𝑙𝑖𝑞_2 
-0.391*** -0.700*** -0.428*** -0.799*** -0.428*** -0.799*** -0.428*** -0.799*** 
(0.013) (0.019) (0.013) (0.040) (0.013) (0.040) (0.013) (0.040) 
𝑙𝑖𝑞_𝑓𝑤𝑑_1 
-0.428*** -1.011*** -0.465*** -1.208*** -0.465*** -1.206*** -0.465*** -1.206*** 
(0.016) (0.038) (0.016) (0.080) (0.016) (0.079) (0.016) (0.080) 
𝑙𝑖𝑞_𝑓𝑤𝑑_2 
-0.281*** -0.551*** -0.315*** -0.677*** -0.315*** -0.676*** -0.315*** -0.676*** 
(0.011) (0.025) (0.011) (0.060) (0.011) (0.060) (0.011) (0.060) 
𝑒𝑥𝑝 
-0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001* -0.001* 0.000 -0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
𝑜𝑟𝑑_𝑑𝑜𝑚_1 
-0.094*** -0.310*** -0.101*** -0.418*** -0.101*** -0.419*** -0.101*** -0.419*** 
(0.017) (0.038) (0.017) (0.076) (0.017) (0.076) (0.017) (0.080) 
𝑜𝑟𝑑_𝑑𝑜𝑚_2 
-0.077*** -0.089*** -0.085*** -0.080* -0.085*** -0.080* -0.085*** -0.080* 
(0.010) (0.020) (0.010) (0.044) (0.010) (0.044) (0.010) (0.044) 
𝑜𝑟𝑑_𝑓𝑜𝑟_1 
-0.078*** -0.108*** -0.088*** -0.128** -0.088*** -0.131** -0.088*** -0.131** 
(0.015) (0.031) (0.015) (0.058) (0.015) (0.058) (0.015) (0.058) 
𝑜𝑟𝑑_𝑓𝑜𝑟_2 
-0.034*** 0.012 -0.043*** -0.035 -0.043*** -0.036 -0.043*** -0.036 
(0.010) (0.020) (0.010) (0.038) (0.010) (0.038) (0.010) (0.038) 
𝑑𝑒𝑚_𝑒𝑥𝑝_1 
-0.129*** -0.277*** -0.147*** -0.230*** -0.147*** -0.229*** -0.147*** -0.229*** 
(0.013) (0.034) (0.013) (0.074) (0.013) (0.074) (0.013) (0.074) 
𝑑𝑒𝑚_𝑒𝑥𝑝_2 
-0.089*** -0.266*** -0.102*** -0.203*** -0.102*** -0.203*** -0.102*** -0.203*** 
(0.011) (0.031) (0.011) (0.067) (0.011) (0.067) (0.011) (0.066) 
𝑏𝑤𝑑 
0.016*** 0.023* 0.048*** 0.011 
(0.006) (0.013) (0.016) (0.014) 
𝑖𝑢𝑠 
0.018*** 0.002 -0.020** 0.011 
(0.004) (0.007) (0.009) (0.008) 
𝑜𝑝𝑛 
-0.053*** -0.090** -0.135*** -0.073* 
(0.018) (0.040) (0.048) (0.042) 
𝑞𝑙𝑝 
-0.160 0.039 0.056 0.040 
(0.147) (0.286) (0.359) (0.306) 
𝑂𝑏𝑠 163,077 163,077 163,077 
𝐿𝐿 -111,557 -102,703.62 -102,683.38 
𝜒2 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
𝐴𝐼𝐶 223,300.3 205,576.3 205,565.3 
𝐵𝐼𝐶 224,230.5 206,516.5 206,545.5 
𝜒2 − 𝑃𝑅𝐴    
Note. As detailed in Section 2.1, the dependent variable is given by firms' appraisal of the credit condition(𝑐𝑟𝑒). Time dummies, 
albeit included among the regressors, are omitted for ease of exposition. Standard errors are in parentheses. Single, double and 
triple stars indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. 𝑂𝑏𝑠 indicates the number of observations. 𝜒2 is the 
test statistics for the hypothesis of null joint impact of covariates on the dependent variable. 𝐿𝐿, 𝐴𝐼𝐶 and 𝐵𝐼𝐶 indicate the value of 
the log-likelihood function, the Akaike Information Criterion, and the Bayesian Information Criterion, respectively. 𝜒2 − 𝑃𝑅𝐴 is the 
test statistics for symmetric impact of the covariates on the dependent variable across categories, with the p-value in square 
brackets. Firm-specific regressors and regional characteristics are defined in Section 2.2 and 2.3, respectively. 
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Table 2 – Average Probability Effects 















0.538** 0.156** 0.476** 0.138** -1.013** -0.293** 
(0.216) (0.0726) (0.191) (0.0640) (0.406) (0.137) 
𝑙𝑖𝑞_1 
7.050*** 13.67*** 6.242*** 12.11*** -13.29*** -25.78*** 
(0.195) (0.487) (0.201) (0.429) (0.348) (0.838) 
𝑙𝑖𝑞_2 
5.052*** 9.431*** 4.473*** 8.350*** -9.525*** -17.78*** 
(0.155) (0.487) (0.154) (0.414) (0.278) (0.864) 
𝑙𝑖𝑞_𝑓𝑤𝑑_1 
5.486*** 14.23*** 4.857*** 12.60*** -10.34*** -26.82*** 
(0.192) (0.941) (0.188) (0.859) (0.350) (1.759) 
𝑙𝑖𝑞_𝑓𝑤𝑑_2 
3.721*** 7.970*** 3.294*** 7.056*** -7.015*** -15.03*** 
(0.130) (0.713) (0.126) (0.630) (0.236) (1.326) 
𝑒𝑥𝑝 
0.00150 0.00255 0.00133 0.00226 -0.00283 -0.00481 
(0.00280) (0.00386) (0.00248) (0.00341) (0.00529) (0.00727) 
𝑜𝑟𝑑_𝑑𝑜𝑚_1 
1.192*** 4.946*** 1.055*** 4.379*** -2.247*** -9.326*** 
(0.203) (0.892) (0.180) (0.796) (0.382) (1.683) 
𝑜𝑟𝑑_𝑑𝑜𝑚_2 
1.003*** 0.938* 0.888*** 0.831* -1.892*** -1.769* 
(0.116) (0.518) (0.104) (0.460) (0.219) (0.978) 
𝑜𝑟𝑑_𝑓𝑜𝑟_1 
1.040*** 1.544** 0.920*** 1.367** -1.960*** -2.911** 
(0.178) (0.684) (0.158) (0.609) (0.335) (1.292) 
𝑜𝑟𝑑_𝑓𝑜𝑟_2 
0.504*** 0.419 0.446*** 0.371 -0.950*** -0.790 
(0.120) (0.447) (0.107) (0.396) (0.227) (0.842) 
𝑑𝑒𝑚_𝑒𝑥𝑝_1 
1.739*** 2.704*** 1.540*** 2.394*** -3.279*** -5.097*** 
(0.155) (0.869) (0.140) (0.768) (0.292) (1.635) 
𝑑𝑒𝑚_𝑒𝑥𝑝_2 
1.203*** 2.398*** 1.065*** 2.123*** -2.267*** -4.522*** 
(0.131) (0.785) (0.118) (0.692) (0.247) (1.475) 
𝑏𝑤𝑑 
-0.560*** 0.277 0.283 
(0.174) (0.226) (0.289) 
𝑖𝑢𝑠 
0.194* -0.518*** 0.323* 
(0.107) (0.140) (0.169) 
𝑜𝑝𝑛 
1.171** 0.425 -1.596* 
(0.536) (0.704) (0.890) 
𝑞𝑙𝑝 
1.785 2.503 -4.288 
(4.156) (5.628) (6.760) 
Note. As detailed in Section 2.1, the dependent variable is given by firms' appraisal of the credit condition (𝑐𝑟𝑒). Average 
probability effects (𝑎𝑝𝑒's) are defined in Section 2.4. Values are multiplied by 100. Time dummies, albeit included among the 
regressors, are omitted for ease of exposition. Standard errors in parentheses. Single, double and triple stars indicate significance at 







Table 3 – Second stage regression 
 Equation A. Equation B. Equation C. Equation D. 
𝑐𝑛𝑠𝑡 
1.715 0.663 3.386 4.646** 
(2.618) (1.761) (2.486) (1.851) 
𝑡𝑟𝑛𝑑 
-0.199** -0.121 -0.278*** -0.324*** 
(0.094) (0.073) (0.084) (0.067) 
𝑖𝑑𝑥𝑡  
4.870*** 
. . . 
(0.941) 








𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑡  . . . 
-2.910*** 
(0.652) 
𝑂𝑏𝑠 41 41 41 41 
𝐿𝐿 -118.627 -121.023 -123.538 -125.950 
𝑅𝑎𝑑𝑗
2  0.752 0.675 0.558 0.503 
Note. As detailed in Section 3.2, the dependent variable is given by the average probability effects of the quarterly time dummies 
on Pr(𝑐𝑟𝑒 = 3), i.e. the probability of a worsening in firms' self-reported assessment of their access to external credit. The 
deterministic component is given by a time polynomial of order one, with 𝑐𝑛𝑠𝑡 and 𝑡𝑟𝑛𝑑 denoting the intercept and the linear 
trend, respectively. The regressors entering Equations A., B., C., and D. are defined in Section 4.1. Heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation consistent standard errors à la Newey and West (1987) are reported in parenthesis. 𝑂𝑏𝑠 indicates the number of 
observations, while 𝐿𝐿 indicates the value of the log-likelihood function. 𝑅𝑎𝑑𝑗





Table 4 – Credit crunch indicator and its determinants: descriptive statistics 
 𝑐𝑐?̃? 𝑞𝑔𝑑𝑝 𝑞𝑠ℎ𝑟 𝑞𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑞𝑛𝑝𝑙 
𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛 0.500  -0.112 0.777 -0.004 3.619 
𝑀𝑖𝑛 0.465  -2.791 0.000 -0.817 -11.229 
𝑀𝑎𝑥 0.569  1.104 4.250 0.451 20.366 
𝐼 𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑒 0.486  -0.559 0.050 -0.167 0.977 
𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛 0.497  0.220 0.580 0.012 4.296 
𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑒 0.514  0.393 1.000 0.143 6.752 
Note. As detailed in Section 4.2, 𝑐𝑐?̃?  refers to the proposed credit crunch indicator which is given by the [0,1] transformation of the 
regression residual from equation (6). As for its determinants, 𝑞𝑔𝑑𝑝 denotes the first difference of the log-level of real GDP; 𝑞𝑠ℎ𝑟  is 
the short-term euro repo rate; 𝑞𝑚𝑎𝑛 stands for the quarterly change of the share of credit supply to the manufacturing sector over 




















Deviance explained 0.603 0.601 
Of which due to: 
𝑞𝑔𝑑𝑝 0.232 0.231 
𝑞𝑠ℎ𝑟 0.142 0.144 
𝑞𝑚𝑎𝑛 0.102 0.102 
𝑞𝑛𝑝𝑙 0.127 0.124 
Note. The conditional mean of the credit crunch indicator is computed as 𝐸(𝑐𝑐?̃?𝑡|𝑄𝑡) = 𝐺(𝑄𝑡𝜃), where 𝐺(. ) is either the logistic 
function (column "Fractional-logit") or the standard cumulative normal distribution (column "Fractional-probit"). The estimated 
values refer to the average partial effects. Standard errors in parentheses. Single, double and triple stars indicate significance at the 




Table 6 - First stages 
 
𝑒𝑚𝑝 𝑙𝑖𝑞_1 𝑙𝑖𝑞_2 𝑙𝑖𝑞_𝑓𝑤𝑑_1 𝑙𝑖𝑞_𝑓𝑤𝑑_2 𝑒𝑥𝑝 𝑜𝑟𝑑_𝑑𝑜𝑚_1 𝑜𝑟𝑑_𝑑𝑜𝑚_2 𝑜𝑟𝑑_𝑓𝑜𝑟_1 𝑜𝑟𝑑_𝑓𝑜𝑟_2 𝑑𝑒𝑚_𝑒𝑥𝑝_1 𝑑𝑒𝑚_𝑒𝑥𝑝_2 
𝑥𝑗,𝑙,𝑠,𝑡−1 
83.04*** 29.20*** 31.35*** 16.71*** 17.39*** 77.07*** 26.73*** 25.62*** 29.91*** 24.42*** 26.76*** 17.09*** 
(1.987) (0.598) (0.799) (0.689) (0.566) (0.408) (0.782) (0.566) (0.736) (0.566) (0.587) (0.584) 
𝑥𝑗,𝑙,𝑠,𝑡−2 
 17.71***           
 (0.491)           
𝑂𝑏𝑠 120,894 120,894 120,894 120,894 120,894 120,894 120,894 120,894 120,894 120,894 120,894 120,894 
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠 6,518 6,518 6,518 6,518 6,518 6,518 6,518 6,518 6,518 6,518  6,518 
𝑅2 0.995 0.894 0.289 0.176 0.0537 0.0693 0.132 0.189 0.205 0.123 0.0793 0.0283 
Note. The Table reports the correlation between each endogenous variable 𝑥𝑗,𝑙,𝑠,𝑡  with its own instrument, 𝑥𝑗,𝑙,𝑠,𝑡−1 (as well as 𝑥𝑗,𝑙,𝑠,𝑡−2 for the case of 𝑙𝑖𝑞_1). Columns indicate the instrumented 
variable and the first row indicates the instrument, i.e. the corresponding first lag, 𝑥𝑗,𝑙,𝑠,𝑡−1. The second row reports the second lag only for 𝑙𝑖𝑞_1. Robust standard errors in parentheses.  Values 
are multiplied by 100. Single, double and triple stars indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. Other regressors, not reported for ease of exposition, are exactly the same 







Table 7 – Comparison between Logit and instrumental variable 

















































𝑂𝑏𝑠 131,367 120,133 
𝑃(𝐹)  0.00 
𝑃(𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟)  0.00 
𝑊𝑒𝑎𝑘 𝑖𝑑 𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 (𝐹)  142.2 
𝑃(𝑆𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑎𝑛 − 𝐽)  0.275 
Note. The dependent variable is the binary dummy 𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑗,𝑙,𝑠,𝑡 defined in Section 5.1. 𝐴𝑝𝑒's in column "Logit-FE", coefficients in 
column "Linear-TSLS", robust standard errors in parentheses. Values are multiplied by 100. Single, double and triple stars indicate 
significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. Firm-specific regressors and regional characteristics are defined in 
Section 2.2 and 2.3, respectively, time dummies, albeit included among the regressors, are omitted for ease of exposition. 𝑂𝑏𝑠 
indicates the number of observations; 𝑃(𝐹) represents the p-value of the joint F-test of no relevance of the entire set of regressors; 
𝑃(𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟) refers to the p-value of the null hypothesis of under-identification; 𝑊𝑒𝑎𝑘 𝑖𝑑 𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 (𝐹) is the F-test of the null hypothesis 
















𝑂𝑏𝑠 41 41 
𝐿𝐿 -119.781 -122.819 
𝑅𝑎𝑑𝑗
2  0.709 0.544 
Note. As detailed in Section 5.2, the dependent variable is given by the average probability effects of the quarterly time dummies 
from the estimates of the Logit-FE and the Linear-TSLS. The deterministic component is given by a time polynomial of order one, 
with 𝑐𝑛𝑠𝑡 and 𝑡𝑟𝑛𝑑 denoting the intercept and the linear trend, respectively, while 𝑖𝑑𝑥 is the index of demand factors presented in 
Section 4.1. Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors à la Newey and West (1987) are reported in 
parenthesis. 𝑂𝑏𝑠 indicates the number of observations, while 𝐿𝐿 indicates the value of the log-likelihood function. 𝑅𝑎𝑑𝑗
2  is the 





















Deviance explained 0.497 0.644 
Of which due to: 
𝑞𝑔𝑑𝑝 0.270 0.326 
𝑞𝑠ℎ𝑟 0.078 0.111 
𝑞𝑚𝑎𝑛 0.076 0.105 
𝑞𝑛𝑝𝑙 0.073 0.102 
Note. As detailed in Section 5.2, the dependent variable is given by the average probability effects of the quarterly time dummies 
from the estimates of the Logit-FE and the Linear-TSLS. The conditional mean of the credit crunch indicator is computed as 







Figure 1 – Generalized RE-OPM estimation results: 𝑎𝑝𝑒’s of fixed time effects 
 
Note. The continuous black line represents the average probability effects of the quarterly time dummies on Pr(𝑐𝑟𝑒 = 3), i.e. the 
probability of a worsening in firms' self-reported assessment of their access to external credit. The grey area identifies the 95 per 





Figure 2 – Generalized RE-OPM estimation results: credit crunch indicator 
 
 
Note. The graph shows the normalised version of the residual term of the regression equation (6) as discussed in Section 4.2: the 
more positive (negative) the contribution of the residual term to the firms’ perception of a restrictive willingness to lend, the higher 
(lower) the likelihood that the economy has experienced an episode of credit crunch. The value of 0.5 line identifies the critical 





Figure 3 – Generalized RE-OPM estimation results: scenario analysis  
Panel A: 𝑞𝑔𝑑𝑝 Panel B: 𝑞𝑠ℎ𝑟 
  
Panel C: 𝑞𝑚𝑎𝑛 Panel D: 𝑞𝑛𝑝𝑙 
  
Note. The bold squares indicate how the conditional mean 𝐸(𝑐𝑐?̃?𝑡|𝑄𝑡) varies when a given predictor in equation (6) moves 
progressively from its maximum to its minimum, by keeping the remaining regressors fixed to their sample averages. The 
simulation exercise is computed at selected sample values (namely, maximum, 90
th
 percentile, third quartile, median, first quartile, 
10
th





Figure 4 – 𝐴𝑝𝑒’s of fixed time effects: evidence from Logit-FE and Linear-TSLS alternatives 
 
Note. The continuous black line refers to the results for the baseline Generalized RE-OPM specification (and plotted in Figure 1), 




Figure 5 – Credit crunch indicator: evidence from Logit-FE and Linear-TSLS alternatives 
 
 
Note. The continuous black line refers to the results for the baseline Generalized RE-OPM specification, while the dashed and 




Figure 6 – Scenario analysis: evidence from Logit-FE and Linear-TSLS alternatives 
I. Logit-FE specification 
Panel A: 𝑥𝑔𝑑𝑝 Panel B: 𝑥𝑠ℎ𝑟 
  
Panel C: 𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑛 Panel D: 𝑥𝑛𝑝𝑙 
  
II. Linear-TSLS specification 
Panel A: 𝑥𝑔𝑑𝑝 Panel B: 𝑥𝑠ℎ𝑟 
  
Panel C: 𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑛 Panel D: 𝑥𝑛𝑝𝑙 
  
Note. See Figure 3 and Table 4.   
